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Race Discrimination in EU Law after Jyske Finans  
 
Case C‑ 668/15, Jyske Finans A/S v Ligebehandlingsnævnet, acting on behalf of 
Ismar Huskic, Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 6 April 2017 
EU:C:2017:278 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Council Directive 2000/43 of 29 June 2000 implemented the principle of equal 
treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin.1 Race Directive, as it 
is commonly called, was the first to take its place in the set of Equality Directives 
enacted under Article 19 of the TFEU which empowered the Council to take 
‘appropriate action to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, 
religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation.’2 The urgency for addressing 
race discrimination was complemented with the comprehensiveness of its prohibition. 
The Race Directive thus ended up having the largest material scope of all Equality 
Directives, covering employment, social protection, healthcare, housing, and 
education.3 It also has fewer exceptions as compared to discrimination on the grounds 
of sex, disability, sexual orientation, religion or age.4 Race directive soon came to be 
seen as ‘more equal than others’5 and at the top of the ‘hierarchy of discrimination’6 
or alternatively, the ‘hierarchy of equalities’.7 
 
This primacy of the Race Directive though has not been mirrored in the docket of the 
ECJ. In comparison with other grounds like sex, age, or even disability, the Court has 
experienced far less litigation in respect of race discrimination, having received only 
nine cases to adjudicate on so far since 2003 when it was implemented in domestic 
law and became directly enforceable. 8  The Court has found allegations of race 
                                                 
1 Directive 2000/43 implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of 
racial or ethnic origin [2000] OJ L180/22. 
2  Other Equality Directives include Employment Equality Directive (2000/78/EC) concerning 
discrimination on the basis of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation and the Sex Recast 
Directive (2006/54/EC) on equal opportunities and equal treatment of women and men in employment 
and occupation.  
3 Employment Equality Directive (2000/78/EC) is limited to the field of employment and occupation 
while Recast Directive (2006/54/EC) concerns only employment and occupation, though sex equality 
is more widely covered independently in relation to statutory social security schemes (Directive 
79/7/EEC), self-employment (Directive 2010/41/EU), supply of goods and services (Directive 
2004/113/EC), and in particular Directives concerning pregnancy (Directive 92/85/EEC), parental 
leave (Directive 2010/18/EU) and part-time work (Directive 97/81/EC). 
4  Bell and Waddington, “More Equal Than Others: Distinguishing European Union Equality 
Directives”, 38 CMLR Rev. (2001), 587, 597-601. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Howard, “The EU Race Directive: Time for Change?”, 8 International Journal of Discrimination and 
the Law, (2007), 237. 
7 Schiek, “A New Framework of Equal Treatment of Persons in EC Law”, 8 European Law Journal 
(2002), 290. 
8 See for a comparison between Equality Directives based on the litigation they have generated: de 
Búrca, “The Decline of the EU Anti-Discrimination Law?”, Note for the Colloquium on Comparative 
and Global Public Law (NYU) (2016), available at 
http://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/upload_documents/The%20Decline%20of%20the%20EU%
20Anti-Discrimination%20Law.pdf (last accessed 3 January 2018). 
  
discrimination to be inadmissible,9 inapplicable10 or unfounded11 in majority of these 
cases. The two notable exceptions have been the landmark decisions in Centrum voor 
Gelijkheid van Kansen en voor Racismebestrijding v Firma Feryn NV12 and CHEZ 
Razpredelenie Bulgaria AD v Komisia za zashtita ot diskriminatsia13 where the Court 
found for discrimination based on ethnic origin. These cases reflected the Court’s 
effort towards developing its jurisprudence for addressing discrimination arising out 
of the stereotypes and prejudices attached to immigrants and Roma in Europe.14  
 
In contrast with these successful cases concerning discrimination on the basis of 
ethnic origin, the judicial approach towards racial discrimination still appears 
wanting. Unlike discrimination on the basis of ethnic origin in Feryn and CHEZ, the 
Court has not issued a substantive ruling on racial discrimination. Gráinne de Búrca 
argues that: ‘while the tiny trickle of cases concern[ing] race discrimination being 
referred is a factor largely outside the control of the [ECJ], nevertheless the Court 
[has] not exactly embrace[d] all the opportunities which were provided to address 
some possibly important questions of racial and ethnic discrimination’.15  Indeed, this 
appears to be true in the case of its latest decision, Jyske Finans A/S v 
Ligebehandlingsnævnet,16 where the ECJ denied a finding of either direct or indirect 
discrimination in case of a practice requiring those born outside of the European 
Union or the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) to provide additional 
documents for identity check. In failing to appreciate, what is perhaps, a typical case 
of race discrimination, Jyske Finans subverts the strides made in Feryn and CHEZ. 
The reasoning and result in Jyske Finans begs the question of what space there is for 
race discrimination in the Race Directive aside of discrimination based on ethnic 
origin.  
 
This note discusses the judgment in Jyske Finans and critically analyses it in light of 
the Race Directive and against the Court’s more progressive equality jurisprudence. It 
argues that the Court’s substantive approach to race or racial discrimination in Jyske 
Finans delimits the possibility of claiming race discrimination under EU law by 
subsuming concerns of race and racism within the construct of ethnic origin. Such an 
approach undermines the logic of the Race Directive, both in terms of its text and its 
context, which reflects an unequivocal commitment towards addressing race 
discrimination in Europe.  
                                                 
9  Case C-10/10, Ministerul Justiţiei și Libertăţilor Cetăţenești v Ştefan Agafiţei and others, 
EU:C:2011:467; Case C-328/04, Vajnai, EU:C:2005:596; Case C‑ 394/11, Valeri Hariev Belov v 
CHEZ Elektro Balgaria AD and others, EU:C:2013:48. 
10 Case C‑ 571/10, Kamberaj v Istituto per l’Edilizia sociale della Provincia autonoma di Bolzano and 
others, EU:C:2012:233. 
11 Case C‑ 415/10, Galina Meister v Speech Design Carrier Systems GmbH, EU:C:2012:217; Case C-
391/09, Malgožata Runevič-Vardyn, Łukasz Paweł Wardyn v Vilniaus miesto savivaldybės 
administracija and others, EU:C:2011:291. 
12 Case C-54/07, Centrum voor gelijkheid van kansen en voor racismebestrijding v Firma Feryn NV, 
EU:C:2008:397 (Feryn). 
13  Case C-83/14, CHEZ Razpredelenie Bulgaria AD v Komisia za zashtita ot diskriminatsia, 
EU:C:2015:480 (CHEZ). 
14 Krause, “Case C-54/07, Centrum voor gelijkheid van kansen en voor racismebestrijding v. Firma 
Feryn NV”, 47 CMLR Rev. (2010), 917; Atrey, “Redefining Frontiers of EU Discrimination Law”, 
Public Law [2017], 185. 
15 de Búrca, supra n8, p. 15; Möschel, “Race Discrimination and Access to the European Court of 
Justice: Belov”, 50 CMLR Rev. [2013], 1433. 
16 Case C‑ 668/15, Jyske Finans A/S v Ligebehandlingsnævnet, EU:C:2017:278 (Jyske Finans). 
  
 
2. Factual and Legal Background 
 
Ismar Huskic and his partner purchased a second-hand car. The payment for the car 
was partly financed through loan by Jyske Finans, a credit institution which 
specialised in financing of motor vehicles. Mr Huskic and his partner provided their 
names, addresses, national identity numbers, and driving licenses for the purposes of 
their loan application. According to its internal policy rules, Jyske Finans asked Mr 
Huskic to provide additional proof of identity since his driving license indicated that 
he was born in Bosnia and Herzegovina. His partner was born in Denmark and was 
thus asked to provide no further proof of identity. While she was Danish by birth, Mr 
Huskic was Danish by naturalisation, having moved to Denmark from Bosnia and 
Herzegovina with his family in 1993 and assuming the Danish citizenship in 2000. Mr 
Huskic thought that Jyske Finans’ request was discriminatory. Jyske Finans thought 
that it was merely discharging its obligation to prevent money laundering by imposing 
these additional checks. The Equal Treatment Board and the District Court, Viborg, 
Denmark, brought upon to consider the issue, sided with Mr Huskic. Jyske Finans 
appealed to the High Court of Western Denmark which then instituted the present 
reference proceedings before the ECJ asking, in particular, three questions. First, 
whether the prohibition on direct discrimination on the grounds of ethnic origin in 
Article 2(2)(a) of Directive 2000/43 could be interpreted to exclude a practice such as 
the present one where persons born outside Nordic countries, Member States of the 
EU, Switzerland or Liechtenstein are treated less favourably than persons in an 
equivalent situation born in these countries? Second, should the first question be 
answered in the negative, did such a practice give rise to indirect discrimination on 
grounds of ethnic origin under Article 2(2)(b) of Directive 2000/43, unless objectively 
justified by a legitimate aim and the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and 
necessary? Third, if the second question were answered in the affirmative, could such 
a practice be justified as an appropriate and necessary means of safeguarding the 
enhanced customer due diligence measures provided in Article 13 of Directive 
2005/60 on money laundering?  
 
These questions were asked in the context of two principal Directives. In the first 
instance, the matter was to be considered in light of the Race Directive. Article 2(2) of 
the Race Directive prohibits both direct and indirect discrimination based on racial or 
ethnic origin. Direct discrimination is defined under Article 2(2)(a) as ‘taken to occur 
where one person is treated less favourably than another is, has been or would be 
treated in a comparable situation on grounds of racial or ethnic origin’. Indirect 
discrimination is defined under Article 2(2)(b) as ‘taken to occur where an apparently 
neutral provision, criterion or practice would put persons of a racial or ethnic origin at 
a particular disadvantage compared with other persons, unless that provision, criterion 
or practice is objectively justified by a legitimate aim and the means of achieving that 
aim are appropriate and necessary.’ The Race Directive does not define racial or 
ethnic origin. In the second place, the matter concerned Directive 2005/60 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2005 which deals with the 
prohibition of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering 
and terrorist financing (“Money Laundering Directive”).17 Article 13 of the Money 
                                                 
17 Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2005 on the 
Prevention of the Use of the Financial System for the Purpose of Money Laundering and Terrorist 
Financing [2005] OJ L 309/15. 
  
Laundering Directive allows Member States to require institutions to undertake 
enhanced customer due diligence in situations which by their nature can present a 
higher risk of money laundering or terrorist financing. These situations include when 
a customer has not been physically present for the transaction and transactions by 
politically exposed persons residing in third countries.  
 
3. Opinion of the Advocate General  
 
Advocate General Wahl delivered his opinion on 1 December 2016.18 He began by 
posing an important question: ‘What does a person’s place of birth say about that 
person’s ethnic origin?’19 And answered it immediately with: ‘Surprisingly little’.20 
According to the Advocate General, ‘to hold that there is an inalienable bond between 
a person’s place of birth and his being of a particular ethnic origin serves, in the final 
analysis, only to maintain certain ill-begotten stereotypes.’21 This line of reasoning 
inspired his finding that the impugned practice in the reference proceedings did not 
constitute discrimination on the basis of ethnic origin. He thus answered the first two 
questions in the negative. 
 
Advocate General’s opinion, that neither direct nor indirect discrimination existed in 
this case, was based on the fact that no racial or ethnic group could be determined 
solely on account of a person’s place of birth. In his view, ‘in order to prevent and 
combat racism, it is necessary to define the concept of ‘race’ itself beforehand’.22 But 
he considered it an inappropriate exercise to undertake in modern times, and thus 
substituted it ‘in favour of the less overt and tangible concept of discrimination on the 
basis of ethnic origin’.23 He then applied the criteria laid down by the Court in CHEZ 
where it was held that the concept of ethnic origin had to do with ‘the idea of societal 
groups marked in particular by common nationality, religious faith, language, cultural 
and traditional origins and backgrounds.’24 While place of birth was not listed as a 
marker of ethnic origin, the Advocate General agreed that it could nonetheless be a 
contributory factor in ascertaining ethnic origin.25 Yet, place of birth alone cannot be 
determinative of ethnic origin. Place of birth should be treated as a ‘self-standing 
criterion of discrimination distinct from other criteria of discrimination such as ethnic 
origin or nationality’ and thus must not be conflated with them.26 In sum, since place 
of birth did not conclusively determine a person’s ethnic origin and it was 
inappropriate to judge place of birth for the purposes of race or racial origin anyway, 
no direct discrimination on racial or ethnic origin could be said to have occurred when 
a person was differentiated based on place of birth.27  
 
Similar reasoning applied as to why the practice did not constitute indirect 
discrimination in the view of the Advocate General. According to him, Article 2(2)(b) 
                                                 
18 Case C‑ 668/15, Jyske Finans A/S v Ligebehandlingsnævnet, Opinion of Advocate General Wahl 
delivered on 1 December 2016, EU:C:2017:278.  
19 Ibid, para 1. 
20 Ibid, para 2. 
21 Ibid, para 3. 
22 Ibid, para 31. 
23 Ibid. 
24 CHEZ, supra n14, para 46. 
25 Opinion of the Advocate General, supra n18, para 36. 
26 Ibid, para 39. 
27 Ibid, paras 4, 43. 
  
of the Race Directive defined indirect discrimination as based on an apparently 
discriminatory measure which had the effect of placing a particular ethnic origin at a 
disadvantage. Identification of a particular ethnic group which was disadvantaged 
was as essential as identifying the ethnic group which was advantaged. So even if it 
were to be agreed that the practice put non-Ethnic Danes like Mr Huskic at a 
disadvantage in comparison to ethnic Danes, the fact that no one particular ethnic 
group could be identified for those affected, made it impossible to conclude that the 
practice fell within Article 2(2)(b). In fact, the practice could be said to affect ‘all 
ethnic origins in the same way, as the third countries potentially contain every ethnic 
origin on the face of the earth.’28 The lack of specificity of an ethnic group based on a 
person’s place of birth was thus fatal to the finding of both direct and indirect 
discrimination.  
 
Based on his position on the second question, the Advocate General did not have to 
consider the third question on justification. However, the Advocate General found it 
useful to answer it anyway, should the Court find that the practice at hand constituted 
indirect discrimination. He then proceeded to reflect on the third question. According 
to Jyske Finans, the impugned practice was instituted in compliance of the legitimate 
aim of preventing money laundering; and was appropriate and necessary in view of 
the general risk assessment based on the applicant’s place of birth (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina) and the lack of physical contact between Jyske Finans and the applicant 
when the loan was agreed.29 On the other hand, the Kingdom of Denmark and the 
Commission argued that the practice went beyond what was necessary since the 
Money Laundering Directive did not establish any link between a person’s place of 
birth and risk of money laundering or financing of terrorism. The practice thus 
contributed towards the general suspicion and stigmatization of those citizens of 
EU/EFTA who were born outside thereof.30 The Advocate General agreed with Jyske 
Finans that the practice may be based on a legitimate aim but ultimately found that the 
means of achieving that aim through the impugned practice were neither appropriate 
nor necessary. In the opinion of the Advocate General, the practice was inappropriate 
because it was not based on individualised risk assessment but simply based on 
general claims or undocumented risk of money laundering or terrorist financing by 
third-country nationals. 31  The practice was also unnecessary in that it applied to 
everyone across the board who was born in a third country.32 Thus, in the opinion of 
the Advocate General, should the practice be determined as constituting indirect 
discrimination under article 2(2)(b) of the Race Directive, it could neither be 
considered objectively justified by the aim of preventing money laundering and the 
financing of terrorism, nor necessary for achieving that aim.  
 
In sum, the Advocate General interpreted Article 2(2) of the Race Directive as not 
precluding the current practice, but found that, should the practice nevertheless be 
determined as a case of indirect discrimination by the referring Court, it could neither 
be objectively justified nor be considered necessary under the Money Laundering 
Directive.  
 
                                                 
28 Ibid, para 67. 
29 Ibid, paras 73-74. 
30 Ibid, para 75. 
31 Ibid, para 88. 
32 Ibid, para 89. 
  
4. Judgment of the Court 
 
The ECJ delivered its judgment on 6 April 2017. In order to answer the first question 
as to whether the practice in question constituted direct discrimination under Article 
2(2)(a) of the Race Directive, the Court embarked on ascertaining whether the 
practice based on a person’s country of birth is to be regarded as directly or 
inextricably linked to his specific ethnic origin. Like the Advocate General, the Court 
referred here to the understanding of ethnicity articulated in CHEZ as connected to the 
idea of ‘societal groups marked in particular by common nationality, religious faith, 
language, cultural and traditional origins and backgrounds.’33 The Court observed that 
even though this understanding is open-ended and place of birth could well be a part 
of the criteria for determining a person’s ethnicity, it could be ‘only one of the 
specific factors which may justify the conclusion that a person is a member of an 
ethnic group and is not decisive in that regard.’34 It thus concluded that: 
 
Ethnic origin cannot be determined on the basis of a single criterion but, on 
the contrary, is based on a whole number of factors, some objective and others 
subjective. Moreover, it is not disputed that a country of birth cannot, in 
general and absolute terms, act as a substitute for all the criteria set out 
[above].35 
 
The Court held that it could not be presumed that place of birth determined a person’s 
ethnicity to be able to ‘establish the existence of a direct or inextricable link between 
those two concepts.’36 In fact, Sovereign states [reflected in the place, as in, the 
country of birth] could not be said to have a single ethnic origin for this presumption 
to arise.37 Thus, the practice of requiring additional documents based on place or 
country of birth did not, in the Court’s view, constitute direct discrimination based on 
ethnic origin. The Court further noted that recital 13 and Article 3(3) of the Race 
Directive excluded the prohibition of differential treatment on the grounds of 
nationality in any case.  
 
Similarly, regarding the second question on indirect discrimination, the Court took a 
cue from the Advocate General’s opinion and stressed that the word ‘particular 
disadvantage’ in the definition under Article 2(2)(b) must be understood as meaning 
that it is ‘particularly persons of a given ethnic origin who are at a disadvantage 
because of the measure at issue’.38 Given that the practice applied to all persons born 
outside the territory of a Member State of the EU or EFTA, there was no certainty as 
to the practice having the effect of putting persons of a particular ethnic origin at a 
disadvantage as compared to Danes.39 Thus, the Court concluded that the practice 
could not constitute indirect discrimination either. Since it answered both the first and 
the second question in the negative, the Court did not consider the need to answer the 
third question on the justification of indirect discrimination based on the Money 
Laundering Directive. It ultimately left for the referring court to make the final 
                                                 
33 Jyske Finans, supra n16, para 17.  
34 Ibid, para 18.  
35 Ibid, para 19. 
36 Ibid, para 20. 
37 Ibid, para 21.  
38 Ibid, para 27 (citing CHEZ, supra n14, para 100). 
39 Ibid, paras 31, 33, 34. 
  
assessment based on its view indicating the absence of both direct and indirect 
discrimination on the grounds of racial or ethnic origin.  
 
5. Analysis  
 
Both the Advocate General’s opinion and the Court’s decision in Jyske Finans rest on 
the premise of what they believe is central to the Race Directive, i.e. a determination 
of ‘ethnicity’ or ‘ethnic group’ for the purposes of protection from discrimination 
based on racial or ethnic origin. Their analysis must then examine this premise closely 
in relation to Article 2 which defines the ‘concept of discrimination’. In the scheme of 
the Race Directive, it must be asked: whether the requirement in Article 2(2)(a) for 
direct discrimination to be based on grounds of racial or ethnic origin demands that a 
criterion like place of birth reflect a particular ethnic group?, and likewise, whether 
the prohibition on indirect discrimination in Article 2(2)(b) demands a particular 
racial or ethnic group to be put at a particular disadvantage in comparison with 
others?  
 
The Court’s own analysis of direct and indirect discrimination appears to be an 
undifferentiated and hasty exercise, characterised by two things. First, the unease with 
having to determine race or racism for the purposes of Article 2(2); and thus, 
secondly, falling back on a limited understanding of ethnicity or ethnic origin laid 
down in CHEZ. In the first instance, the Court does not consider the factual situation 
in light of racism or racial discrimination and focuses instead, as asked by the 
referring court, on whether the practice based on place of birth was ultimately based 
on ethnic origin. The Court is categorical from the outset that: ‘For the purpose of 
answering [the referred] questions, it is necessary to establish whether a practice such 
as that at issue in the main proceedings introduces a difference in treatment based on 
ethnic origin within the meaning of Article 2 of Directive 2000/43.’40 The Court does 
not consider the possibility of racial discrimination at all. The unease with racial 
discrimination is more palpable for the Advocate General who not only deems it 
unacceptable to define race for the purposes of the Race Directive but also readily 
accepts ‘the less overt and tangible concept of discrimination on the basis of ethnic 
origin’ as a good substitute for the entirety of ‘discrimination based on racial or ethnic 
origin’: 
 
From the outset, in order to prevent and combat racism, it is necessary to 
define the concept of ‘race’ itself beforehand. However, that exercise has 
become increasingly unacceptable in modern societies. Accordingly, over time 
the prohibition against discrimination on the basis of racial origin has perhaps 
ceded its pre-eminence in favour of the less overt and tangible concept of 
discrimination on the basis of ethnic origin which…is a form of racial 
discrimination.41  
 
Thus, in the second instance, both the Court and the Advocate General rely on the 
limited, merely indicative list of the markers of ethnic origin identified in CHEZ as 
                                                 
40 CHEZ, supra n14, para 15. 
41 Opinion of the Advocate General, supra n18, para 31. For a critique of this position which relies on 
the absence of races to argue for an absence of racism in Europe, see Möschel, “Race in Mainland 
European Legal Analysis: Towards a European Critical Race Theory”, 34 Ethnic and Racial Studies 
[2011], 1648. 
  
‘common nationality, religious faith, language, cultural and traditional origins and 
backgrounds’ and conclude that place of birth could not in and of itself be seen as a 
marker of ethnic origin.  
 
Such an analysis sacrifices the form and substance of direct and indirect 
discrimination under Article 2(2) of the Race Directive. This is because the inquiry 
into, whether place of birth is determinative of ethnic groups, does not speak to the 
determination of either direct or indirect discrimination per se. To recall, according to 
Article 2(2)(a), direct discrimination is ‘taken to occur where one person is treated 
less favourably than another is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation 
on grounds of racial or ethnic origin’. The present case involved a practice based on 
place of birth outside the Nordic countries, and the Members States of the EU and 
EFTA. The practice was clearly not based on racial or ethnic origin on the face of it. It 
was a neutral one in fact. The only inquiry which had to be made was then about the 
effects of the neutral practice and whether it put persons of a racial or ethnic origin at 
a particular disadvantage compared with other persons for the purposes of Article 
2(2)(b) of the Race Directive. Like direct discrimination, the Court interpreted this as 
indirect discrimination being contingent on the identification of a specific ethnic 
group which has been put at a particular disadvantage as compared to others.42 
 
There are several reasons to doubt this interpretation—textually, conceptually, and 
contextually. To recall the text of Article 2(2)(b), indirect discrimination occurs 
‘where an apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice would put persons of a 
racial or ethnic origin at a particular disadvantage compared with other persons.’ The 
phrase racial or ethnic origin is preceded with the indefinite article ‘a’ which, in 
ordinary semantics, means non-specific or any racial or ethnic origin. It is thus not the 
same as saying a particular racial or ethnic origin and especially not a specific racial 
or ethnic origin. What is clear though in Article 2(2)(b) is a requirement for ‘a 
particular disadvantage’ suffered by a racial or ethnic group in comparison with 
others who do not belong to it. Equating the particularity of disadvantage to mean the 
specificity of a particular racial or ethnic group requires some explanation. The Court 
in Jyske Finans cites CHEZ in this regard. In CHEZ, the Court had been asked by the 
referring court to reflect on the meaning of ‘particular disadvantage’ and whether it 
meant only ‘serious, obvious and particularly significant’ disadvantage under Article 
2(2)(b) of the Race Directive. The Court had rejected this interpretation and found 
that in fact ‘particular disadvantage’ were to be understood as meaning that it is 
‘particularly persons of a given ethnic origin who are at a disadvantage because of the 
measure at issue.’43 The Court in Jyske Finans interprets this reference in light of the 
observation of the Attorney General that: ‘for the purposes of ascertaining whether a 
person has been subject to unfavourable treatment, it is necessary to carry out, not a 
general abstract comparison, but a specific concrete comparison, in light of the 
favourable treatment in question.’44  Applying this to the facts at hand, the Court 
concluded that it was ‘sufficient to note that that requirement [practice] is applicable 
without distinction to all persons born outside the territory of a Member State of the 
                                                 
42 CHEZ, supra n14, para 32 (‘for the purposes of ascertaining whether a person has been subject to 
unfavourable treatment, it is necessary to carry out, not a general abstract comparison, but a specific 
concrete comparison, in the light of the favourable treatment in question.’). 
43 Ibid, para 100. 
44 Ibid, para 32. 
  
European Union or the EFTA.’45 The fact that the practice targeted all persons born 
outside the territory of EU/EFTA Member States meant that there was no ‘specific 
concrete comparison’ to establish ‘particular disadvantage’ suffered by an ethnic 
group in Jyske Finans.46 Comparison between persons of Danish ethnicity and all 
others was thus too general to be convincing. For the Court, the requirement of ‘a 
particular disadvantage’ would have been satisfied only with the existence of a 
specific concrete comparison of an ethnic group that was put at a disadvantage with 
another ethnic group and not with a comparison between some ethnic groups (all non-
Danes) versus an ethnic group (Danes). It is debatable whether the reasoning in CHEZ 
truly supports this interpretation. CHEZ’s interpretation of ‘particular disadvantage’ 
had to do with the threshold of disadvantage suffered, not the identification of the 
disadvantaged groups. In fact, CHEZ’s interpretation of ‘persons of a given ethnic 
origin’ (Roma) being put at a particular disadvantage, unambiguously included the 
non-Roma who suffered along with the Roma, because even if they did not belong to 
the given ethnic group they shared the particular disadvantage accruing from the 
neutral practice of installing electricity meters above a certain height.47  The non-
Roma who suffered along with the Roma could have belonged to any ethnic group. 
The fact that several ethnic groups would have been affected by the neutral criterion 
did not stop the CHEZ Court from finding that the particular disadvantage condition 
under Article 2(2)(b) was satisfied in respect of identifying the disadvantaged 
group(s) suffering indirect discrimination.  
 
The Court’s substantive approach to discrimination on the basis of racial and ethnic 
origin in CHEZ thus appears disadvantage not comparator-based, a view first 
expressed in Feryn.48 The Court in Feryn had found statements of Directors of a firm 
which meant to exclude ‘immigrants’ from the recruitment process to be 
discriminatory towards people of a certain ethnic or racial origin.49 In fact, one of the 
central takeaways from Feryn and CHEZ was the Court’s lack of doggedness over 
exactly those who may or may not actually belong to racial or ethnic groups suffering 
discrimination, but instead, focusing on the kind of disadvantages people suffered on 
the basis of racial or ethnic origins, their own or of others with whom they shared that 
disadvantage. Thus, in CHEZ, the Court had held that the policy of installing 
electricity meters above a certain height in a predominantly Roma district constituted 
direct discrimination because it was based on ‘ethnic stereotypes or prejudices’ which 
branded Roma as potential perpetrators of electricity theft.50 Similarly, for indirect 
discrimination the Court held that: ‘[indirect] discrimination is liable to arise when a 
national measure, albeit formulated in neutral terms, works to the disadvantage of far 
more persons possessing the protected characteristic than persons not possessing it.’51 
In Jyske Finans, the question which must then have been asked was: were there more 
non-ethnic Danes and EU Citizens born outside the EU and EFTA Member States 
who were liable to be affected by the practice than those born in the Nordic countries, 
EU and EFTA Member States?  
 
                                                 
45 Jyske Finans, supra n16, para 29. 
46 Ibid, para 32. 
47 CHEZ, supra n14, paras 48, 50, 60. 
48 Atrey, supra n15, p. 187.  
49 Feryn, supra n13, paras 2, 16. 
50 CHEZ, supra n 14, paras 82, 84. 
51 CHEZ, supra n14, para 101. 
  
The answer to this question reveals the ‘particular disadvantage’ suffered by non-EU 
and EFTA born citizens in comparison with others. The disadvantage stems from the 
fact that everyone who was not born in the EU or EFTA was taken to be a potential 
money launderer or terrorist financer and thus, was to provide additional proof of 
identity. The unwitting acceptance of such an assumption is the disadvantage at the 
heart of Jyske Finans. The disadvantage is particular in the sense that it affects 
everyone born outside of the EU or EFTA in the same way, i.e., it comprehensively 
brands non-EU or EFTA birth as suspect for the purposes of the money laundering 
legislation. Conceptually, this appears to hit right at the core of racism or racial 
discrimination. Take for example, Sandra Fredman’s remarks: 
 
Racism is…not about objective characteristics, but about relationships of 
domination and subordination, about hatred of the ‘Other’ in defence of ‘Self’ 
perpetuated and apparently legitimated through images of the ‘Other’ as 
inferior, abhorrent, even subhuman.52 
 
Similarly, Evelyn Ellis and Phillipa Watson explain: 
 
The concept of racism is on several occasions linked in the Preamble [of the 
Race Directive] with ‘xenophobia’, defined in the Shorter Oxford English 
Dictionary as a ‘morbid dread or dislike of foreigners’; this might perhaps 
indicate that the directive is primarily targeted at discrimination against racial 
groups (whatever they may be) whose origin is outside the EU.53 
 
Racism or racial discrimination, thus may not be about the definitions of racial or 
ethnic groups per se but about the kind of disadvantages which have come to be 
associated with them in the European context. According to Fredman, one such 
disadvantage is in being treated as the ‘Other’ and hence inferior than ‘Self’, and 
according to Ellis and Watson, it may indicate a dislike for foreigners or those whose 
origins are outside of the EU/EFTA. The impugned practice in Jyske Finans fits these 
understandings squarely, of treating those born outside of the EU/EFTA as second 
class, even though, they may, like Mr Huskic be citizens of Member States of the EU 
or EFTA. 54  Such an understanding, like Article 2(2)(b) itself, does not rest on 
defining the ‘Other’ but defining the particular disadvantage of being treated or 
affected as the ‘Other’. Understood conceptually, place of birth stands in for such 
‘Otherisation’ as a form of racism or racial discrimination. In the current socio-
political, economic and cultural terms, place of birth serves as a placeholder for 
Eurocentric bias, particularly towards those born in more powerful and exclusive 
European countries which have come to form the EU and EFTA. The assumption here 
being that those born outside of these countries are not Danes or Europeans belonging 
to the EU or EFTA, like Mr Huskic. While some ethnic Danes, and Europeans from 
EU and EFTA Member States too may be affected, the practice is liable to 
disadvantage ‘far more persons’ who are ethnically not Danish or Europeans from EU 
or EFTA. Again, while they may not reflect a single particular racial or ethnic group, 
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the implication of being subjected to a different policy when one was not born in 
these countries is a common one – of being seen and disadvantaged as the ‘Other’ and 
having to provide extra identification.  
 
The European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) in fact drew exactly this conclusion 
in Biao v Denmark. 55  The case involved a challenge to Danish laws on family 
reunification according to which a family seeking to settle in Denmark had to satisfy 
the “28 year rule” according to which either one of the partners should have been a 
Danish national for at least 28 years or, in case of non-Danish nationality, had been 
born and/or raised in Denmark and had lived there lawfully for 28 years. In the case 
of Mr Biao, neither was the case since he was Danish by naturalization for only nine 
years while his wife was a Ghanian national. The “28 year rule” was challenged as 
indirectly discriminatory on the basis of racial or ethnic origin under Article 14 on the 
right to equality in conjunction with Article 8 on the right to respect for private and 
family life of the European Convention of Human Rights. Even though the Danish 
government had provided no real statistics to show exactly how this rule operated in 
practice, the Court found that it could ‘reasonably be assumed’ that a vast majority of 
those affected by this rule were going to be of non-Danish or foreign ethnic origin.56 
It thus held the rule to be indirectly discriminatory on the basis of racial or ethnic 
origin under Article 14. The approach adopted by the Strasbourg Court is instructive 
for two reasons. First, the ECtHR did not deem indirect discrimination to be based on 
proving that those affected by the rule were of a particular ethnic origin understood 
as an identifiable cohesive ethnic group which was disadvantaged by the practice, 
even though the test of indirect discrimination under ECHR is similarly framed as in 
EU law.57 Secondly, the Court concentrated on the disadvantage or disproportional 
prejudicial impact on non-ethnic Danes like Mr Biao, reflecting and reinforcing 
negative stereotypes about their lifestyles and integration into the Danish 
community.58 This then became the substantive touchstone of discrimination based on 
racial or ethnic origin prohibited in Article 14 of the ECHR rather a substantive 
determination of the racial or ethnic groups protected by the prohibition on 
discrimination.59 
 
The ECJ in CHEZ and Feryn had shown the possibilities of developing the 
substantive content of discrimination under the Race Directive in this way. While 
neither of the cases dealt with race or race discrimination, but mainly discrimination 
                                                 
55 ECtHR, Biao v Denmark, Appl. No. 38590/10, judgment of 24 May 2016. 
56 Ibid, para 112. 
57 According to the ECtHR: “The Court has accepted in previous cases that a difference in treatment 
may take the form of disproportionately prejudicial effects of a general policy or measure which, 
though couched in neutral terms, discriminates against a group”. Ibid, para 103 (citing ECtHR, Hugh 
Jordan v the United Kingdom, Appl. No. 28883/95, judgment of 4 May 2001, para 154; ECtHR, DH 
and Others v the Czech Republic, Appl. No. 57325/00, judgment of 7 February 2006, para 184). Cf 
Opinion of the Advocate General, supra n18, para 65, where he observed that Article 14 ‘does not 
suggest that it is necessary to identify a particular ethnic origin targeted by a discriminatory measure, 
that is not the case for Article 2(2)(b) of Directive 2000/43.’ 
58 See in particular Biao v Denmark, supra n55, Concurring Opinion of Judge Pinto de Albuquerque, 
para 13. 
59 Mathias Möschel argues that the ECtHR in Biao “made an important step towards challenging some 
of the racial underpinnings existing in numerous European (im)migration rules and their racial impact 
on non-White, non-Christian (im)migrants and European citizens.” in Möschel, “The Strasbourg Court 
and Indirect Race Discrimination: Going Beyond the Education Domain”, 80 Modern Law Review 
(2017) 121, 122. 
  
on the basis of ethnic origin, they both showed the Court’s inclination towards using a 
touchstone of disadvantage understood as, inter alia, stereotypes and prejudices, for 
assessing discrimination given that no substantive definition of ‘direct or indirect 
discrimination based on racial or ethnic origin’ existed in the text of the Race 
Directive itself. Jyske Finans was a real opportunity for the Court to continue to 
develop substantive understandings of discrimination, especially race discrimination. 
The reasoning of the EtCHR in Biao and the works of leading scholars in the field 
provided useful cues for this. In fact, the context in which the Race Directive emerged 
shows similar leanings of the idea of race discrimination in Europe. Article 19 of the 
TFEU, which was the basis of the Race Directive, was introduced after a longstanding 
demand from the civil society and European Parliamentarians alike ‘to empower the 
EU to address issues of race discrimination and the rise of xenophobia in Europe.’60 
The Race Directive, adopted within just a year of Article 19 coming into force, was 
meant to combat the growing racial discrimination in Europe. 61  The distinctions 
between Europeans, and Europeans and others, are the kind of distinctions that were 
deemed discriminatory for the purposes of the Race Directive. This is confirmed by 
the thoroughgoing account of race discrimination by Mark Bell, where he finds that: 
‘[c]onsidering the policy discourse that surrounded the adoption of the [Race] 
Directive, there is significant evidence that ethnic discrimination was viewed as a 
matter predominantly affecting immigrants and their descendents’ 62  and that the 
‘concept of racism implies a strong nexus between racism and discourse on 
immigration.’63  As Bell further remarks, when country of birth (or even parents’ 
country of birth) is the only readily available data in most EU Member States 
(including until recently, the UK), it often becomes the criterion for racial or ethnic 
distinctions or identification of groups on that surrogate basis.64 Place or country of 
birth thus becomes the markers of continued ‘Otherisation’ of even citizens of these 
Member States being treated as perpetual immigrants and outsiders. Whilst place of 
birth cannot itself determine ethnic origin or racial groups for the purposes of direct 
discrimination, it can be a neutral criteria which leads to indirect discrimination on the 
basis of race. This was the connection the Court failed to make in its reasoning on 
indirect discrimination.65  
 
Racial or ethnic origin discrimination thus has deep roots in Eurocentrism, 
xenophobia, and intolerance of foreigners, immigrants and outsiders. Viewed in its 
originating context, textual framework, and conceptual meaning, Race Directive and 
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Article 2(2) seem to have been adopted to remedy exactly the kind of situation in 
Jyske Finans. The Court’s approach to addressing the situation by, first, defining 
ethnic origin, and then isolating a particular ethnic group as the victim of 
discrimination, has little to do with the substantive idea of racial discrimination. It 
begs the question, if not this, then what is racial discrimination for the purposes of the 
Race Directive?  
 
According to the Advocate General and the Court, when dealing with the Race 
Directive, one must pour over ethnic origin as a more determinative and appropriate 
space to intervene, rather than race, racism and racial discrimination. They take their 
cue from recital 6 of the Race Directive that rejects theories which attempt to 
determine the existence of separate human races. But they take the rejection of 
different races to mean a rejection of racial discrimination as an overarching concept 
where people continue to face disadvantages associated with social construction and 
perceptions of race and racial origin; and instead, focus on discrimination based on 
ethnic origin which is merely, as acknowledged by the Advocate General, a form of 
racial discrimination. 66  With this reasoning Jyske Finans fortifies, what some 
commentators recognise as, the growing phenomenon of ‘European silence on race’.67 
This is ironic given the textual, contextual and conceptual grounding of the Race 
Directive, spelled out above. On paper, the Race Directive remains the one with the 
widest material scope and with the least number of exceptions of all the Equality 
Directives. The way to discourage or defeat claims of racial or ethnic origin 
discrimination is then to just not find for it substantively, especially in indirect cases 
which are not explicitly based on race or ethnic origin. Jyske Finans seems to do just 
that and thus, delimits the possibility of claiming racism or racial discrimination under 
EU Law in a substantive sense.  
 
~ Shreya Atrey, Lecturer, University of Bristol Law School 
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